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THREE PROPOSALS TO HARNESS PRIVATE
INFORMATION IN CONTRACT
IANAYREs*
How should judges decide contract cases when they realize
that private parties know more about what is good for them than
the judges themselves know? This is a crucial question in
structuring contract law, because if judges knew private
valuations, we could dispose of contracts altogether and simply
let judges order welfare-maximizing trade. Savvy judges,
however, realize that they are normally less informed than
private litigants and will accordingly be prone to error in
deciding cases. The famed "nirvana fallacy"! appears when
judges or commentators forget that it is difficult for third parties
to identify the social optimum. How then should judges
operating under conditions of relative ignorance avoid the
nirvana fallacy?
My general (but rather uninteresting) answer is that judges
deciding contract cases should harness the parties' private
information. This is not a new answer. In some ways it is the idea
behind the theory of efficient breach. Expectation damages
encourage a promisor to breach only when her information tells
her that breach is likely to be efficient.2
* Townsend Professor, Yale Law School. ayres@mail.law.ya!e.edu. Allan Farnsworth,
Eric Posner, and Alan Schwartz provided helpful comments.
1. The "'nixvana fallacy'" occurs when one compares the failings of the unregulated
market to some "'ideal institution [that] has never existed or ••• has been proven
impossible to devise.'" Richard L. Hasen, Clipping Coupons for Derrwcracy: An
Egalitarian/Puhlic Choice Defense ofCampaign Finance Voucher.r, 84 CAL. L. REV. I, 17 (1995)
(quoting Maxwell L. Stearns, The Misguided Renaissance ofSocial Choice, 103 YALEL.J. 1219,
1229-30 (1994».
2. The notion that liability rules (including expectation damages) could harness
private information is implicit in Guido Calabresi & A. Douglas Melamed, Property Rules,
Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One Vzew of the Cathedral, 85 HARV. L. REV. 1089 (1972),
and was recendy formalized in Louis Kaplow & Steven ShaveIl, Property Rules Vmus
Liability Rules: AnEcolWl1lic Analysis, 109 HARv. L. REV. 713 (1995). Alan Schwartz's theory
of relational contracting is also centered on the notion that judges systematically know
less than the private litigants. See Alan Schwartz, Relational Contracts in the Courts: An
Analysis ofInarmpleteAgreements andJudidfd Strategies, 21J. LECALSTUD. 271 (1992).
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But instead of merely explaining existing ruIes/1 r want to
apply this idea of harnessing private information to make three
proposals about how judges should decide contracts cases. In
particular, r favor (1) interpretive safe harbors; (2) extending
4the rule ofHadley v. Baxendale to benefit buyers as well as sellers;
and (3) giving defendants the option of making injunctions
. inalienable.
I. INTERPRETIVE SAFE HARBORS
My first claim concerns interpretive disputes-where parties to
a contract disagree about what obligations the actual contract
created. In resolving these disputes, judges must decide which
interpretation wins. But in addition to deciding who wins, judges
should routinely tell the losing side what magic words would
have reversed the result. In other words, judges should give the
litigants an interpretive safe harbor that would establish the
contractual obligations that the losing side preferred. Judges
need not detail the necessary conditions for reversing the result
or describe the complete legal mapping from all possible words
to all possible legal outcomes, but they should at least announce
3. The goal of harnessing private information might, for example, e>.'Plain the
common-law rule that counteroffers destroy the effectiveness ofoffers. An initial offeror
often cannot know whether or not there are gains of trade to be had in a particular
negotiation. Thus, ifEllickson offers to buy Rose's house for Sx, Ellicl:son might not
know whether Rose's value (known as the best alternative to negotiated agreement
("BATNA"), or reservation price) is greater or less than $x. But some offerees know for
sure that there are gains of trade. If Rose's reservation price is less than Sx, Rose has
private information that there are gains of trade. IfRose's reservation price is more than
$x, Rose cannot know whether or not there are gains of trade. Ellickson might not have
offered alI that he is willing to pay and further negotiations might reveal a zone of
agreement.
Here is where the counteroffer rule comes into play. The rule discourages offcrees
who know there are gains of trade from continuing to bargain-but does not discourage
offerees who are nying to learn whether there are gains of trade. Offerees who know
there are gains of trade risk losing a valuable option when they make a counteroffer, but
offerees who receive an offer less favorable than their BAlNA do not give up anything
when they destroy an offer they would never accept. The counteroffer rule thus dissuades
offerees from continuing to bargain when they know that bargaining is inefficient
(merely for the purpose ofredistributing gains of trade) while not discouraging efficlent
bargaining (for the purpose ofdiscovering whether gains of trade exist). This analysis of
the counteroffer rule was proposed in rough form by Ben Burman in his first semester
contracts course at Yale Law School. The idea that contract law should discourage
individual parties from taking actions that they know to be socially inefficient is parallel
to later discussion ofusing inalienable injunction to discourage parties from threatening
performance they know to be inefficient. See infra, text accompanying notes 22-28.
4. 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng. Rep. 145 (1854).
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a sufficientcondition for producing the contractual result desired
by the losing side.
Routinely providing interpretive safe harbors would be a
judicial innovation. Judicial opinions in contract cases almost
never include this information. This failure to provide
alternative contractual language is particularly striking where
the parties have tried to contract around a default obligation but
the court rules that their efforts were insufficient to displace the
default. For example, in Peevyhouse v. Garland Coal & Mining
Co./ the litigants added language to a fonn contract, apparently
in an attempt to contract around the "diminution in value"
damage measure that applies in absence of agreement to the
6
contrary. The Oklahoma Supreme Court held that the
contract's additional language was not sufficient to avoid the
"diminution in value" default and create "cost of performance"
damages instead. Even if the court's substantive decision was
correct,1 the court erred by not indicating to future contractors
whatwords would be sufficient to produce a cost of performance
result.
Interpretive safe harbors harness the private information of
prospective contractors. Safe harbors reduce the costs ofjudicial
mistakes, because future parties can easily avoid the
inefficiencies of bad decisions by simply using the magic words.R
Moreover, providing language sufficient to produce an
alternative result protects freedom of contract. Safe harbors
make clear that the court's holding is not an immutable or
mandatory rule. Charles Goetz and Robert Scott have
documented the tendency of courts to change default rules into
immutable rules that are impossible for future parties to avoid.9
5. 282 P.2d 109 (Okla. 1962).
6. See id., at 111·12. In JfW)lJ & Young.r, Inc. v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 (N.Y. 1921), the
litigants made a similar attempt to contractaround this gap-filler.
7. There are strong reasons tojudge it incorrect. A cost ofperformance interpretation
would have given the repeat and more powerful player (for eXample, the coal company)
a better incentive to inform the other party when the only measure ofdamages might be
diminution in value.
8. A participant at the Symposium worried that Uninformed parties might unwittingly
use the magic words to produce an unintended result. This should not be a problem as
long as the safe harbor .language conforms to common understandings. Alternatively, if
the magic words included a reference to the case citation itself ("Contrary to Peevylwuse,
we intend to award cost ofperformance damages."), ignorant litigants would not be able
to blunder into the safe harbor.
9. SeeCharlesJ. Goetz 8: RobertE. Scott, The Limits ojExparuJed Clwke: An Analysis ofthe
Interactions BetweenExpress and Implied Contract Tenns, 73 CAL. L. REV. 261 (1985).
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A practice of announcing alternative language would 'Work
against this tendency and force courts to state more directly
when (and why) they were choosing to displace freedom of
contract.
By thus reinforcing future parties' freedom to structure their
contractual obligations as they see fit, interpretative safe harbors
are consonant with judicial constraint. 'While urging the
judiciary to decide the legal import of alternative contractual
words smacks ofjudicial activism, in the realm of contractjudges
effectively eschew power by telling prospective parties how they
might alternatively order their respective obligations.
At the Symposium, I pointed to the famous language in
Miranda as an example of how courts can usefully provide safe
harbor language. to Several audience members reflexively
retorted that any proposal analogized to Miranda must be bad.
But especially ifyou do not think the government should have a
duty to warn suspects, the Court's willingness to provide a safe
harbor warning mitigated the harm of the decision. Imagine
how much worse the Miranda decision would have been if the
Court had told police to warn suspects, but refused to articulate
what type ofwarning would be sufficient.
In recent years, a number of federal circuits have begun
routinely analyzing the standard of review even though choosing
between different standards of review is often not necessary to
decide particular cases. This simple change has quickly provided
a wealth of new law, as evinced by an exploding West Key
Number. A similar practice of routinely analyzing how the losing
litigant might have achieved its proffered interpretation could
give future contractors the option of prospectively overruling
misguidedjudicial decisions by contracting around them.
II. EXTENDING HADLEY
The Hadley v. Baxendale principle oflimiting damages to those
that are foreseeable is such a good idea that we should allow
buyers to benefit from it as well as sellers. Currently, sellers can
use the Hadley principle to limit the amount of their damages
when they have breached.J1 Rather bizarrely, there is no
10. Mirandav. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436. 467-70 (1966).
11. In Hadley itself. the seller-carrier was able to reduce its liability for failing to deliver
on time.
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analogous rule to benefit buyers. When buyers breach contracts,
they cannot limit the sellers' damages only to those that are
reasonably foreseeable.
The possibility of a seller claiming unforeseeable damages is
particularly probable when the seller is claiming damages for
lost profit. Since the seller's mark-up is often not known by the
buyer/2 awarding lost profit can at times subject a buyer to
considerable uncertainty about the consequences of breaching.
Imagine, for example, that you have contracted to purchase a
speed boat (as in Neri v. Retail Marine Corp.J:\ but have had a
change of heart and are considering whether or not to breach.
It may be extremely difficult for you to predict your potential
damages because courts will not limit lost-profit damages to
those thatwere reasonably foreseeable.
A bit ofpersonaI narrative underscores the buyer's dilemma. I
once negotiated with Orkin Corporation to have monthly
pesticide treatment for my home. Orkin insisted that they would
enter only into year-long contracts. However, I was thinking
about moving to another city in six months. So like a good
Holmesian, I asked "What would be the consequences if I
breach? What are you going to claim as lost profits?» Orkin, of
course, steadfastly refused to tell me what the damages would
be. Even when buyers inquire, they are not protected by the
Hadley principle. And a story similar to my pesticide experience
could be told with regard to a number of different transactions,
including, for example, Book-ofthe-Month Club agreements
and cellular phone contracts.
What then explains why Hadley only protects sellers? If we
move beyond the rather arid doctrinal characterization that a
seller's lost profits are not considered to be' "consequential»
damages,14 there is a substantive distinction concerning the
contract price. Consequential damages for a seller's breach can
be significantly larger than the contract price, while lost profits
for a buyer's breach can never exceed this price. Hence, the
contract price itself puts an upper bound on potential damages
.
12. Sedan Ayres &: F. Clayton Miller, "I'a Sell It To You at Cost": Legal Methods to Promote
Retail Markup Disclosure, 84 NW. U. L. REv. 1047 (1990).
13. 285 N.E.2d 311, 312 (N.Y. 1972).
14. One might merely restate the question as follows: why does the Hadley principle
apply only to consequential damages, or why are lost profits not considered to be
consequential?
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that a buyer might have to pay. Sellers need the Hadley principle
more because neither the price nor any other contractual term
provides a ceiling for a seller's potential liability.
Yet admitting that sellers need Hadley protection more than
buyers does not establish that it is unwise to extend the
principle. In competitive markets, lost-profit damages 'Would be
a small fraction of the total price. Accordingly, the structural
damage cap provides relatively weak protection against lost-
profit damages substantially exceeding the amounts that a
consumer foresaw. For example, in buying a new car for
$25,000, a breaching buyer can take little solace in the fact that
her lost-profit liability cannot be above $25,000. The possibility
of seller's lost-profit damages of three, five, or eight thousand
dollars would still be largely unforeseen by many buyers.
Breaching buyers who face large lost-profit have some hope of
reducing their damages by claiming that the initial contract was
unconscionable. Unconscionability, however, (like the structural
damage ceiling) is a poor substitute for the Hadley principle.
Contracts are almost never struck down for unconscionable
price terms.15 Moreover, there is a substantive difference
between an unconscionable profit and an unforeseeable profit.
A wide range of seller markups that are substantively
conscionable might still be unforeseeable.16 At the end of the
day, the" current rules governing lost-profit damages might
subject buyers to substantial, unforeseeable damages, even when
buyers make inquiry.
The Hadley principle would mitigate this problem by making
damages more foreseeable. Because the Hadley principle is a
default rule, limiting sellers' liability to foreseeable damages
gives buyers an incentive to inform sellers of their idiosyncratic
sensitivity to sellers' breach, and often leads to avoidance of the
default rule through the use of a liquidated damages clause in
the initial contract. The Hadley principle thus has an
information-forcing quality that harnesses the private
15. See 1 STEWARTMACAUlAVETAL., CONTRACTS: LAwINACfION 756 (1995).
16. Foreseeability is related only to the procedural aspect ofunconsdonability. not the
substantive aspect. See Arthur Leff, Unamscionability and the Code-The Emperor's New
Clause, 115 U. PA. L. REv. 485 (1967).
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infonnation of buyers and gives sellers a better idea of the
17
consequences ofbreach.
Analogously, extending the Hadley principle to protect buyers
would harness the private infonnation of sellers. Limiting
sellers' lost-profit damages to those that were reasonably
foreseeable would encourage sellers to disclose unusually high
markups.IS Such disclosure would promote efficiency by letting
buyers calculate how much effort they should expend to avoid
breach. When there is a high probability that a buyer will need
to breach (as in my Orkin example), disclosure of lost-profit
damages through a liquidated damages provision would give the
buyer a better sense of whether the contract was on net
beneficial.
To be sure, some sellers contracting for high profits under a
Hadley regime ,vill prefer to take the chance of non-disclosure
(and reduced damages if the buyer breaches) rather than
infonn the buyer ofa high markup. Therefore, it might be even
advisable to go beyond the Hadley default and institute a zero-
dollar default for lost profits.19 Sellers would remain free to
contract for full lost-profit damages by means of appropriate
disclosure in a liquidated damages clause. Even if the Hadley or
zero-dollar defaults did not induce disclosure, these defaults
would at least promote equity by exposing buyers only to those
damages thatwere reasonably foreseeable.
At the Symposium, Eric Posner was surprised to hear me
suggest extending the Hadley principle, because Rob Gertner
and I had previously shown that the Hadley principle was the
efficient default for seller's breach only under certain
conditions.20 Yet given the widespread acceptance of this
principle on grounds of equity as well as efficiency, it is difficult
to argue that it should not be extended to protect buyers.
Indeed, once the Hadley default is seen as an information-
forcing or pro-disclosure rule, the current state of the law seems
17. See Ian Ayres 8: Raben Germer, FiUing Gaps in Inrompltle Contracts: An Economic
Theory ofDifau1l1Wl~. 99 YALEL.J. 87, 101-04 (1989).
18. Seeil!.
19. See iII. at 105; Victor P. Goldberg, AnEconomic Amzlysis ofthe Lost-Volume Retail Seller;
575. CAL. L. REv. 283 (1984).
20. See Ian Ayres 8: Raben Germer, Strategic Contractual lne.JJiciencJ and the optimal
Choice of Ltgal Ruler, 101 YALE L.J. 729 (1992); Lucian A. Bebchuk 8: Steven shavell,
Information and the Scope ofLiabilityfor Breach ofContract: The Rule ofHadleyv. Baxendale, 7
J.L. ECON. 8: ORG. 284 (1991).
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particularly perverse. Steven Shavell has insightfully shown that
most disclosure rules are directed at sellers, not buyers.21
However, under current contract law, it is the buyer and not the
seller who is encouraged by the Hadley principle to disclose
unexpectedly large damages.
m. INALIENABLE INJUNCIlONS
Whenever a judge uses his equitable power to grant an
injunction, he should give the party against whom the
injunction is running the option of making the injunction
inalienable.22 As an empirical matter, a substantial proportion of
injunctions are purchased, not performed. Plaintiffs seeking
injunctions often do not 'want the injunction for its own sake,
but instead want to use the threat of forced performance as
bargaining leverage to extract a payment from the defendant
larger than any monetary damages the court might award.
Myriad examples of this phenomenon come to mind,23 but to
focus on a specific context, consider the classic encroachment
case of Pile v. Pedrick.24 In Pile, the subterranean foundation of
the defendant's brick wall encroached one and three-eighths
inches underneath the plaintiff's property. As is routine in such
circumstances, the plaintiff landowner brought suit seeking an
injunction to remove the wall and rejected the option of
monetary damages. Because monetary damages were likely to be
only one-t\ventieth the cost of moving the fence (say, $500 as
likely monetary damages versus $10,000 to move the
foundation), an injunction might allow the plaintiff to extract
from the defendant a sum substantially above the likely
monetaIy damages amount.
What is striking about cases like Pile is this: the plaintiffs know
that performance of the injunction would be inefficient.
. 21. See Steven ShaveD, Acquisition and Disclosure ofInfonnation PrUrr to Sale, 25 RAND J.
ECON.20 (1994).
22. The ideas in this section will be presented more fully in a forthcoming article, Ian
Ayres &: Kristin Madison, Threatening Inefficient PerJonnance (unpublished manuscript, on
file with author).
23. See, e.g.,Judge Richard Posner's decision in NMthemIndianaPub. Servo Co. v. Carbon
Coun~ Coal Co., 799 F.2d 265, 279-80 (7th Cir. 1986) (stating that ~Carbon County is
seeking specific performance in order to have bargaining leverage with NIPSCO, and we
can think ofno reason why the lawshould give it such leverage").
24. 31 A. 646 (Pa. 1895). I would like to thank Robert EUickson for bringing this case
to my attention and for generally holding my hand throughout my maiden voyage as a
property professor.
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Nonetheless, these plaintiffs ask the court to order inefficient
behavior so that they can induce the defendant to pay to avoid
the inefficiency. It is presumptively inefficient for plaintiffs to
ask courts to order inefficient performance. Such behavior by
plaintiffs creates needless bargaining costs, and when bargaining
fails, results in inefficient performance. Moreover, these
plaintiffs (and their lawyers) seem to be perpetrating a fraud on
the court. The plaintiffs represent that no amount of monetary
damages would be sufficient to make them whole and then,
before the ink is dry on the nyunction, they turn around and try
to sell their injunctive rights for money.
One way to deter such behavior would be for judges to issue
"inalienable nyunctions" whenever they thought that the
plaintiff was seeking inefficient performance.25 An inalienable
injunction would not only order the defendant to perform but
would also prohibit the defendant from pa~~ the plaintiff
money as an alternative to discharging this duty.2 The prospect
of an inalienable injunction would deter some plaintiffs from
seeking inefficient performance. In the encroachment context,
for example, monetary damages of $500 may look more
attractive to a plaintiff than having the defendant move the wall
an inch.
25. The common law already at times calls upon judges to assess the efficiency of
iryunctions. See R:EsrATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §826(a) (1979) (stating nuisance is
unreasonable if"the gravity ofthe harm outweighs the utility of the actor's conduct~). See
also Thomas W. Merrill, Trespass, Nuisance and the Costs ofDetemliningProperty Rights, 14J.
LEGALSTUD. 13 (1985).
26. The inalienability would only restrict the plaintifffrom selling the benefits of the
iryunction back to the defendant. For example, if the ixyunction ordered a seller to
specifically perform its promise to supply widgets, the buyer could of course resell the
widgets to anyone else in the world-it simply couId not sell its right to receive widgets to
theseUer.
Implementing inalienable injunctions creates at least two complications. First, both
plaintiffand defendant. not withstanding the settlement prohibition, would have an ex-
post incentive to agree to payment instead of inefficient performance. To make the .
injunction truly inalienable, therefore, judges would probably need to place a jUdicial
lien on the defendant's property that would be lifted only upon showing that the
ixyunction had been performed. And second, the courts would need to prohibit
monetary settlements after the defendant had irrevocably opted for an injunction
(instead of monetary damages). Ifdefendants could irrevocably opt for injunctive relief
early in litigation, then plaintiffs would have the same incentives to settle for inflated
amounts before the injunction actually issued. For this reason, the courts should
probably give the defendant a choice ofan inalienable injunction only at a late stage in
the proceeding (possibly after the liability determination). See generally, Ayres &: Madison,
supra note 22.
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While judicially imposed inalienability harnesses the
defendant's information and guides defendants to seek
injunctions more often when perfonning the injunction is
actually efficient, we can do still better. The problem with
judicially imposed inalienability is that judges do not have
perfect information about when performing an injunction
would be inefficient (that is, when the defendant's cost of
performance is greater than the plaintiff's benefit from
performance). Accordingly, judges might mistakenly impose
inalienability too rarely or too often.27
Instead of letting the judge decide whether an injunction
should be inalienable, it is better to let the defendant decide.
Inalienability is supposed to deter the plaintifffrom threatening
enforcement of inefficient injunctions by making those threats
not credible. But the defendant knows better than the judge
when inalienability is likely to deter the plaintifffrom seeking an
injunction. Giving the defendant an inalienability option allows
the defendant's private information to impede inefficient action
by the plaintiff. The defendant's option constructively offsets the
plaintiff's option of choosing injunctive or monetary relief.28
These offsetting options harness both sides' information.
Returning to our earlier example, a defendant encroacher
should have the right (read: option) to say to the court, "Your
honor, if you decide to issue an injunction against me, at least
don't let the plaintiff turn around and use the injunction to
extract money from me."
27. At first, it might seem that inalienability should be judicially imposed in all cases.
But the possibility ofundercompensatory damages could lead to circumstances in which
inalienability creates inefficiency. For example, consider an encroachment case in which
the defendant's cost of performance is $10,000, the plaintiff's benefit of performance is
$2,000, but the monetary damages that a counwould award are only $1,000. Under these
assumptions, the injunction is inefficient ($10,000> $2,000), but because damages are
not fully compensatory ($2,000 > $1,000), the plaintiff would opt for an inalienable
injunction instead ofdamages-causing an $8,000 inefficiency loss. The defendant might
well prefer to be subject to an alienable injunction, where if the litigants split the gains of
trade, the defendant would only have to pay $6,000 to avoid its injunctive duty. In Ayres
& Madison, supra note 22, we explore a system of privately imposed additur and
remittitur to harness private parties' information and mitigate such problems ofsuper- or
subcompensatory damages.
28. See Ian Ayres & J.M. Balkin, Legal Entitlements as Audions: Property Rukr, Liability
Rules, and BeJ'tJnd, 106YALE L]. 703, 720-27 (1996) (demonstrating how reciprocal taking
options can harness two parties' private information as they decide whether to take a
particular piece ofproperty).
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This essay has sketched three rather disparate proposals for
changing contract law. But the proposals are connected by the
idea of harnessing the superior knowledge of private parties.
Interpretive safe harbors harness the private information of
prospective contractors who can more accurately tailor the
distribution of contractual obligations. Extending the Hadley
principle to benefit buyers harnesses sellers' private information
by encouraging disclosure of lost-profit information which will
allow buyers to take more efficient precaution. Finally, giving
defendants the option of making injunctions inalienable
harnesses both plaintiffs' and defendants' information to deter
plaintiffs from threatening inefficient enforcement.
Let me underscore that each of these proposed rules should
be default rules that would allow people to reach other results
when they contract for them explicitly. Yet even the process of
contracting out of these proposed rules would harness the
parties' information. Great strides have been made in the last
twenty years in understanding the economics of imperfect
information. This relatively new body of knowledge should aid
Professor Manne's project of using economics to further
29personal freedom.
29. See Henry G. Manne, TheJudiciary and FTee Markels, 21 HARV.J.L. &: PUB. POL'Y 11
(1997).
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